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ORTHODOX RELIGIOSITY AMONG ELITE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN
RUSSIA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS
Irina Papkova

Dr. Irina Papkova, who teaches at Central European University, Budapest, completed
her dissertation on “Orthodoxy and Democracy in Russia: New Interpretations” at
Georgetown University, Washington DC, in 2006. She invites response to the analyses
presented here.

Among analysts of the religious situation in Russia, it has become common
wisdom that, despite the high number of people identifying themselves as Orthodox,
the actual religiosity of Orthodox Russians is quite low, with the proportion of actively
practicing laypeople hovering somewhere around 3 – 5%. A few researchers have
identified the rising popularity of “Orthodox religiosity outside church walls,”
including religious processions, pilgrimages and even Orthodox markets/pravoslavnye
iarmarki; however, the fact remains that only a small percentage of Russian society is
likely to have a deep enough understanding of fundamental Orthodox beliefs to
consciously incorporate them into political decision making.1 This “on the ground
reality” suggests that the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate’s political positions on
the electorate is not likely to be very high.2 Accordingly, most Western studies of
Russian voting behavior have ignored the question of adherence to Orthodoxy
altogether; those that have paid attention to it have consistently noted its minimal
impact.3 At the same time, the equally consistent presence of an “active-Orthodox”
minority in the population (the 3 – 5 % who attend church regularly) has prompted a
few scholars to explore the possibility that at least the active Orthodox are affected by
the Russian Orthodox Church in their political choices. Here, existing research is
contradictory. Christopher Marsh, for example, has found that “whereas Russian

1

Inna Naletova, “Orthodoxy Beyond the Walls of the Church: A Sociological Inquiry into
Orthodox Religious Experience in Contemporary Russian Society” (PhD diss., Boston University, 2006).
2
In this essay, I am interested exclusively in the political positions of the Moscow Patriarchate,
which is the administrative structure of the Russian Orthodox Church. It should, therefore, not be confused
with the Russian Orthodox Church (or ROC) writ large.
3
Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 128; Timothy J. Colton, Transitional Citizens: Voters and
What Influences Them in the New Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 85.
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citizens are only loosely predisposed towards democratic governance, devout
Orthodox Christians as a group are somewhat more favorably inclined towards
democracy.”4 On the other hand, survey data obtained from the Moscow State
University (MGU) sociology department indicate that “devout/active” Russian
Orthodox youth (ages 15-30) are less inclined towards democracy than their nondevout Orthodox peers (58.2% and 62%, respectively).5
The MGU survey, conducted across 26 regions, reports data on the percentage
of active Orthodox that are slightly higher than the conventional wisdom: Of the 1805
respondents, 8% identify themselves as active believers (here, “active” presupposes
going to communion once a year and keeping, at a minimum, Great Lent). The
importance of this detail lies in the fact that it points to a possible generational factor.
As more Russians have grown up in a post-Soviet environment, the percentage of
people seriously adhering to the Orthodox faith may perhaps be rising; this might, in
the not-so distant future, alter the picture described above in favor of a stronger
influence by the ROC on the electorate. If that is the case, it becomes critical to
determine whether or not the actively Orthodox are more likely to be influenced by the
Moscow Patriarchate in their political views than other categories of the Russian
population.
In order to do so, I conducted a survey across nine higher educational
institutions in Moscow in the spring of 2006.6 These included four Orthodox
universities: St. Tikhon Orthodox Humanitarian University (STPBU); the Orthodox
University of St. John the Theologian (OU); the Moscow Spiritual Academy and
Seminary (MDA); and St. Filaret Orthodox-Christian Institute (St. Filaret’s). I
administered the same survey to students at five elite secular universities: The Moscow
State University (MGU), the Moscow State Institute for International Relations
4

Christopher Marsh, “Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy”
Demokratizatsiya, 13, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 449.
5
“Otnoshenie Molodezhy k Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi” Unpublished data obtained from sociology
department of Moscow State University. I am grateful to the Assistant Dean, Igor P. Riazantsev, for sharing
the data with me prior to its publication.
6
I actually surveyed students across ten universities, but one of them, St. Andrews BiblicalTheological Institute, proved problematic: It is a tiny institution, with only 60 students, of whom I surveyed
20; moreover, despite its “Orthodox” nature the institute is quite ecumenical and more than half of the
students were not Orthodox, with not all of them even identifying themselves as believers, making it
difficult to categorize the responses from this institute.
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(MGIMO), the Moscow Aviation Technical Institute (MATI), the Peoples’ Friendship
University (RUDN), and the Mendeleev Chemistry and Technology Institute (RHTU).
All total, I administered the survey to 792 respondents, across a wide variety of
departments, capturing the range of under and upperclassmen at these universities.
The questions asked were structured around the political positions of the
Moscow Patriarchate, to determine whether they corresponded in any way to the belief
systems of the respondents. The Patriarchate’s positions might be best summarized as
follows:
1.

First, the Moscow Patriarchate has no preference for a type of government, and
is willing to work within a democratic environment.

2.

Second, the Patriarchate expects to be independent from state control while at
the same time demanding state support and cooperation in the endeavor to
better society. A certain ambiguity remains regarding the desirability of state
church status.

3.

Third, while the Patriarchate accepts freedom of conscience as reality it is not
positively viewed; relations with other religious groups are to be encouraged
as long as they lead to the betterment of Russian society. Some religious groups
are viewed as clearly destructive and therefore to be strenuously opposed; the
traditional religions (Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and “traditional” Christians)
are to be respected (and assisted).

4.

Fourth, the media and secular culture generally are called upon to respect the
Patriarchate’s positions on moral issues, and to refrain from disrespectful
criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church (with “respectful” being defined by
the Patriarchate).

5.

Fifth, the Patriarchate is cautious about certain aspects of globalization and
willing to criticize Western actions that are perceived as anti-Russian and/or
anti-Orthodox; at the same time the Patriarchate is against political, cultural and
economic isolation, and cannot be called xenophobically anti-Western.

6.

Finally, the Patriarchate favors socialist ideals of economic justice; at the same
time, there is no evidence indicating the Patriarchate’s attitude towards state
intervention in the economy: The point is that economic organization should be
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just, but no form is explicitly rejected as inherently unjust.7
In accordance with these parameters, the questions that I posed in the survey
were as follows:
1. Today the ideal form of government in Russia is: (Monarchy, Democracy,
Theocracy, Dictatorship, Other, Don’t Know)
2. For the benefit of society, the government should introduce censorship in
the media (Agree, Unsure, Disagree)
3. The West consciously pursues an anti-Russian policy agenda (Agree,
Unsure, Disagree)
4. It is important for Russia to have good relations with the United States and
Europe (Agree, Unsure, Disagree)
5. Globalization is a negative phenomenon (Agree, Unsure, Disagree)
6. The state should fully control all natural resources (Agree, Unsure,
Disagree)
7. The market economy has brought Russia: (Only good, More good than
harm, More harm than good, Only harm, Difficult to respond)
8. Ideally, the state is fully responsible for the citizens’ welfare (Agree,
Unsure, Disagree)
9. I (Agree fully, Agree but not always, Unsure, Disagree) with the proposition
that “To be Russian is to be Orthodox”
10. The state should ban harmful sects (Agree, Unsure, Disagree)
11. The Orthodox Church should be constitutionally the state religion (Agree,
Unsure, Disagree).
At the secular universities, I added two other questions:
1. Your relationship to religion: (Orthodox, Other Confession, Agnostic,
Atheist) and
2. If Orthodox, I attend church approximately: (Once a week, Once a month,
A few times a year, Once a year).
·
In response to this question, 63% identified themselves as Orthodox, 13% as belonging
to another confession, 4% as Agnostic, 11% as Atheist and 3% did not respond. Of the
Orthodox students, 7% reported attending church once a week, 16% once a month, 46%
a few times a year, and 31% once a year. Thus, according to the categories elaborated
above, 23% of the Orthodox students surveyed can be considered “Active Orthodox”,
7

This categorization is based on research conducted for my dissertation at Georgetown University:
Orthodoxy and Democracy in Russia: New Interpretations, defended in December 2006. I have chosen not to
elaborate on my understanding of the Patriarchate’s political positions in this article, as I do so in the
manuscript of the book that is based on the dissertation (manuscript currently under revision).
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while 77% can be considered “Nominal Orthodox.” Of the entire population surveyed,
9% can be considered actively Orthodox. This figure corresponds to the higher end
estimates of the actively Orthodox portion of the “youth” population calculated by
MGU (at 8%).
The resulting data is presented here under several different angles, each
allowing for a further understanding of the relationship between self-identification as
Orthodox and a particular set of political views. The first table presents the results of
the survey of all 792 respondents taken together.
Table 1. Aggregate results of 9 Moscow Universities (792 respondents)
Preference for type of regime

The media should be censored

The West is a purposeful, active adversary

Russia should have good relations with the US/Europe

Globalization is a negative phenomenon

The state should control all natural resources

The market economy has brought Russia

Ideally, the state is fully responsible for citizens’ welfare

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 2 (May 2008)

Monarchy 26 %
Democracy 38 %
Theocracy 3 %
Dictatorship 9 %
Other
10 %
Don’t know 13 %
No answer 1 %
Agree
46 %
Unsure 24 %
Disagree 29 %
No answer 1 %
Agree
54 %
Unsure
30 %
Disagree 15 %
No answer 1 %
Agree 43 %
Unsure 33 %
Disagree 22 %
No answer 2 %
Agree 36 %
Unsure 44 %
Disagree 19 %
No answer 1 %
Agree 88 %
Unsure 8 %
Disagree 3 %
No answer 1 %
Only good 5 %
More good 48 %
More bad 18 %
Only bad 1 %
Hard to say 27 %
No answer 1 %
Agree 53 %
Unsure 24 %
Disagree 22 %
page 5

To be Russian is to be Orthodox

Harmful Sects should be banned

Orthodoxy should be state religion

No answer 1 %
Agree fully 34 %
Agree but not always 35 %
Disagree 29 %
Not sure 1 %
No answer 1 %
Agree 81 %
Unsure 12 %
Disagree 7 %
Agree 43 %
Unsure 23 %
Disagree 33 %
No answer 1 %

The results here seem to fit with the official positions of the Moscow
Patriarchate.

For example, the even distribution between those who favor an

authoritarian form of government (38%) and those favoring democracy (38%) seems
to follow the Patriarchate’s neutral approach towards this issue. In terms of media
censorship, only about 30% disagreed, as opposed to the 70% who thought that it might
at least possibly be a good idea. At the same time, even though more than half of the
respondents are anti-Western, the majority is not keen to support a strong anti-Western
policy stance (43% agreeing and 22% unsure about whether or not Russia should have
a good relationship with Europe and the US), and is ambivalent about the negative
effects of globalization (44% unsure that it is a negative phenomenon), again more or
less in line with the Patriarchate’s mild but not isolationist anti-Westernism and antiglobalism. The same ambivalence can be seen in regard to the market economy (53%
agreeing that it has had a generally positive effect on Russian life) and individual
responsibility for welfare (53% feeling that the state should be responsible), all of which
is in line with the Patriarchate’s neutral stance on economic matters. At the same time
the respondents are clearly statist (90%) when it comes to natural resources, a position
held by the more conservative flank of the Russian Orthodox Church. Finally, the
respondents seem to follow the pattern of the Patriarchate’s discourse on church-state
relations: Acknowledging the Russian Orthodox Church’s predominant role in the
formation of Russian culture (70% supporting the notion that “To be Russian is to be
Orthodox), anti-sectarian (81%) and ambivalent about the desirability of granting the
Church state church status (43%).
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Given these seeming intersections, it may be tempting at this stage to posit that,
at least among Russia’s college-age population, there is indeed some congruence
between the formally elucidated positions of the Patriarchate on the issues under
discussion and the political orientations of the Russian population. Data provided by
the MGU survey already mentioned appear to confirm this: There, 67% of the
respondents think that sects are causing harm to Russian society and should be banned,
and 72% view Orthodoxy as the basis of Russian state and cultural traditions.8
However, without a further breakdown of the data assigning Orthodoxy a causal role
here would be premature, as any number of factors might be contributing to the
generally conservative mood of the students surveyed. Accordingly, Table 2 compares
the responses of the students of the Orthodox universities to those of the secular
institutions. The St. Filaret Institute is by definition on the liberal wing of Orthodoxy,
with its students consistently responding from liberal political positions; the institute
may therefore be fairly considered an outlier, and is left out of the analysis in this table.

Table 2. Comparison of Orthodox Universities (without Saint Filaret) and Secular
Universities (287 respondents and 470 respondents, respectively)
Preference for type of regime

The media should be censored

Orthodox Universities
Monarchy
46 %

Secular Universities
17 %

Democracy

19 %

48 %

Theocracy

5%

1%

Dictatorship 7 %

11 %

Other

11 %

6%

Don’t know 16 %

11 %

No answer 1 %
Agree
74 %

1%
31 %

Unsure

15 %

30 %

Disagree

9%

38 %

No answer 2 %
The West is a purposeful, active Agree 70 %

1%
46 %

adversary

Unsure 23 %

32 %

Disagree 6 %

20 %

Russia should have good

No answer 1 %
Agree 21 %

2%
55 %

relations with the US/Europe

Unsure 41 %

29 %

8

“Otnoshenie Molodezhy k Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi”
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Disagree 36 %

15 %

Globalization is a negative

No answer 2 %
Agree 62 %

1%
22 %

phenomenon

Unsure 29 %

50 %

Disagree 7 %

27 %

The state should control all

No answer 2 %
Agree 94 %

1%
86 %

natural resources

Unsure 4 %

9%

Disagree 1 %

4%

The market economy has

No answer 1 %
Only good 1 %

1%
7%

brought Russia

More good 33 %

57 %

More bad 27 %

15 %

Only bad 1 %

2%

Hard to say 37 %

19 %

No answer 1 %
Agree 61 %

50 %

Ideally, the state is fully

responsible for citizens’ welfare Unsure 27 %
Disagree 11 %
No answer 1 %
To be Russian is to be Orthodox Agree fully 49 %

23 %
27 %
28 %

Agree but not always 33 %

40 %

Disagree 16 %

30 %

Unsure 1 %

1%

No answer 1 %
Harmful Sects should be banned Agree 92 %

1%
78 %

Unsure 4 %

15 %

Orthodoxy should be state

Disagree 4 %
Agree 68 %

7%
30 %

religion

Unsure 16 %

29 %

Disagree 15 %

40 %

No answer 1 %

1%

The differences between the two survey results are striking across all counts.
The only question on which the students of the “Orthodox” universities show
themselves to be fewer than 10 percentage points more conservative than their
“secular” peers is in regard to the desirability of state control of resources: 94% and
86% respectively feel that the state should have this prerogative. It is true that, on the
surface, there is also less than a 10 percentage point difference regarding the market
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economy: Only 1 % of the “Orthodox” students and 7 % of the “secular” feel that it
brought Russia “only good.” However, once the categories “only good” and “more
harm than good” are combined, it turns out that whereas only 34 % of the “Orthodox”
students feel the market experience has been generally positive, fully 64 % of the
“secular” students feel this way. 61% of students at the Orthodox universities feel the
state should be fully responsible for citizen welfare, as opposed to 50% of the
respondents at the secular institutions; the difference when it comes to banning sects
is at 14 percentage points. On all other counts, the “Orthodox” students show
themselves at least 20 percentage points more conservative than their “secular”
counterparts, with the difference climbing to 30 percentage points or above on the
questions of monarchy and relations with the US and Europe. Finally, the differences
reach approximately 40 percentage points or more on the question of whether or not
the media should be censored, globalization and the desirability of “state Church”
status for the ROC. On all these counts, the students of the “Orthodox” universities are
far more conservative than their “secular” peers.
What is the cause of such an obvious polarization of attitudes among the
respondents? There are two possible answers. One option is that the conservatism of
the students from Orthodox institutions stems from their adherence to the Orthodox
faith. Such a reply seems plausible given that the students of these three institutions
(MDA, St. Tikhon’s, St.John’s) can all be understood to be “active” Orthodox: In all
three schools, a commitment to regular church attendance is a requirement.
Alternatively, the reason might lie in the institutional culture of the “Orthodox”
universities, which may have over the years simply acquired conservative traits
independent of specifically religious reasons. To further clarify this issue, it is
instructive to compare the political orientations of Orthodox and non-Orthodox
students within the secular universities, to see if the category “Orthodox believer” has
any relationship to a more conservative world view:
Table 3: Comparison of Orthodox believers versus non-Orthodox students at the
secular universities (324 and 146 respondents, respectively)
Orthodox believers

Non Orthodox

Student Preference for type of

Monarchy

17 %

regime

Democracy

17 %
51 %

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 2 (May 2008)
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Theocracy

The media should be censored

2%

3%

Dictatorship 10 %

10 %

Other

15 %

9%

Don’t know 10 %

13 %

No answer

0%

Agree

1%
36 %

21 %

Unsure

32 %

26 %

Disagree

31 %

53 %

No answer 1 %

0%

The West is a purposeful, active

Agree 49 %

39 %

adversary

Unsure 31 %

36 %

Disagree 18 %

24 %

No answer 2 %

1%

Russia should have good relations Agree 53 %

60 %

Unsure 30 %

27 %

Disagree 16 %

12 %

No answer 1 %

1%

Globalization is a negative

Agree

23 %

18 %

phenomenon

Unsure 50 %

50 %

Disagree 26 %

31 %

No answer 1 %

1%

The state should control all

Agree 89 %

78 %

natural resources

Unsure 7 %

14 %

Disagree 3 %

7%

No answer 1 %

1%

with the US/Europe

The market economy has brought Only good 7 %

8%

More good 57 %

55 %

More bad 15 %

12 %

Only bad 2 %

3%

Hard to say 19 %

21 %

No answer

1%

Ideally, the state is fully

Agree 54 %

40 %

responsible for citizens’ welfare

Unsure 21 %

26 %

Disagree 24 %

33 %

No answer 1 %

1%

Russia
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To be Russian is to be Orthodox

Agree fully 12 %

2%

Agree but not always 54 %

22 %

Disagree 30 %

72 %

Unsure 3 %

3%

No answer 1 %

1%

Harmful Sects should be banned Agree 85 %

62 %

Unsure 11 %

22 %

Disagree 4 %

14 %

No answer

1%

Orthodoxy should be state

Agree 41 %

7%

religion

Unsure 28 %

28 %

Disagree 30 %

64 %

No answer 1 %

1%

The Orthodox believers here are shown to be notably more (10 percentage points
or more) conservative than the non-Orthodox students across seven of the eleven
parameters. This includes the question of media censorship (+15 points), the West (+10
points), state control of resources (+11 points), state responsibility for citizen welfare
(+14 points), the “Orthodox” nature of “Russianness” (a total of 66% agreeing that this
is the case at least some of the time, as opposed to 24% of the non-Orthodox believing
the same), the desirability of banning sects (+23 points) and the desirability of
institutionalizing Orthodoxy as the state religion (+34 points).
Interestingly, the difference stays between 10 and 15 percentage points on the
purely political and economic questions, and reaches the 20 point or more range when
the issues are directly related to religion (Orthodoxy/Russianness, sects, state church
status), suggesting that here there may well be something inherent about “Orthodoxy”
as a causal factor. As far as the other four questions, the differences between Orthodox
and non-Orthodox students do not seem to be appreciable; only on the issue of relations
with the US/Europe are the Orthodox more conservative by more than 5 percentage
points. Oddly enough, when it comes to form of government, the Orthodox students
are actually more democratic: Though the proportion of monarchists in both categories
of respondents is equal (17 %), the Orthodox students here are actually 9 percentage
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points more in favor of democracy than the non-Orthodox. In general, however, on the
question of form of government, there does not seem to be a significant difference
between the proportion of respondents openly favoring some form of authoritarianism:
(29 % of the Orthodox, 30 % of the non-Orthodox).
Given that the results of comparing the Orthodox students to non-Orthodox are
somewhat ambiguous (the Orthodox seem to be more conservative but not nearly in the
same proportions as when the Orthodox and secular institutions are compared in Table
5), it is useful to trace the connection between the level of commitment to Orthodoxy of
the Orthodox students of the secular universities and their political views. If we follow
the hypothesis according to which the conservatism of the Orthodox students is tied to
the faith itself (that is, to the students actively following the official political positions
of the Church) then higher levels of religious commitment should correspond to higher
levels of political conservatism (since the active Orthodox students have, by definition,
a deeper understanding of their faith and should be more inclined to follow the
Church’s lead on political matters). And vice-versa: The lower the level of adherence
to Orthodoxy, the more liberal the political orientations should be.
Based on these considerations, the Orthodox respondents of the “secular”
universities are divided here into “active” and “nominal” Orthodox. The “active”
students attend church a minimum of “once a month” or “once a week” (74
respondents), while the “nominal” students attend church “a few times a year” or “once
a year” (250 students). The results of this comparison are presented in Table 4:
Table 4. Secular Universities: “active” Orthodox vs. “nominal Orthodox” (74 and 250
respondents, respectively)
Active Orthodox

Nominal Orthodox

Preference for type of regime

Monarchy
Democracy
Theocracy
Dictatorship
Other
Don’t know
No answer

17 %
51 %
1%
11 %
9%
11 %
0%

The media should be censored

Agree
38 %
Unsure
29 %
Disagree 31 %
No answer 2 %

19 %
47 %
3%
9%
11 %
8%
3%

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 2 (May 2008)
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Agree 49 %
Unsure 34 %
Disagree 16 %
No answer 1 %

50 %
30 %
18 %
2%

Russia should have good relations Agree 51 %
with the US/Europe
Unsure 29 %
Disagree 19 %
No answer 1 %

53 %
31 %
15 %
1%

Globalization is a negative
phenomenon

Agree 23 %
Unsure 50 %
Disagree 26 %
No answer 1 %

23 %
51 %
25 %
1%

The state should control all
natural resources

Agree 83 %
Unsure 8 %
Disagree 8 %
No answer 1 %

91 %
7%
1%
1%

The West is a purposeful, active
adversary

The market economy has brought Only good 3 %
Russia
More good 39 %
More bad 22 %
Only bad 1 %
Hard to say 34 %
No answer 1 %

12 %
58 %
14 %
1%
15 %
0%

Ideally, the state is fully
responsible for citizens’ welfare

Agree 54 %
Unsure 27 %
Disagree 19 %
No answer 0 %

54 %
19 %
26 %
1%

To be Russian is to be Orthodox

Agree fully 26 %
Agree but not always 47 %
Disagree 24 %
Unsure 2 %
No answer 1 %

8 %
56 %
32 %
4%
0%

Harmful Sects should be banned

Agree 81 %
Unsure 15 %
Disagree 4 %

86 %
10 %
4%

Orthodoxy should be state religion Agree 50 %
Unsure 23 %
Disagree 27 %
No answer 0 %

38 %
30 %
31 %
1%

The relationship between the level of commitment to Orthodoxy and
conservative values does not clearly follow the proposed hypothesis: There does not
seem to be a direct relationship between deepened Orthodoxy and deepened
conservatism. First of all, the level of religious commitment does not appear to influence
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 2 (May 2008)
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the attitude of the students here towards the ideal form of government: Both categories
of respondents are relatively liberal (about 50% for democracy and 30% for authoritarian
forms of governance). Attitudes towards media censorship are not affected either. Also,
a higher level of commitment to Orthodoxy does not appear to be related to noticeably
heightened anti-Western attitudes or a desire for an actively anti-US/anti-European
foreign policy stance. Nor does there appear to be an obvious connection between
religious commitment and a negative attitude towards globalization or to the level of
belief in the responsibility of the state for citizen welfare.
At the same time, the level of commitment to Orthodoxy possibly relates
positively to the perception of the market economy: 70% of the “active” Orthodox
students rate the market experience positively as opposed to 62% of the “nominal”
Orthodox. Moreover, the “active” students are somewhat more liberal than the
“nominal” in terms of the control of natural resources (82% to 91%). On the other hand,
the “active” Orthodox students of the “secular” universities are somewhat more
conservative than the “nominal” Orthodox when it comes to the role of the Orthodox
church in Russian society: 73% either partially or fully agree with the idea that “To be
Russian is to be Orthodox” (among the “nominal” Orthodox, 64% responded in the same
way). However, slightly fewer of the “active” Orthodox students agreed that sects
should be banned (5 percentage points less). Finally, 50% of the active Orthodox would
like to see the ROC constitutionally guaranteed as the state religion; in this respect, their
views are clearly more conservative than those of their “nominal” colleagues (38%).
Yet more interesting is the comparison of the “actively Orthodox” students of the
“secular” universities and the students of the “Orthodox” universities, who may be
considered actively Orthodox by definition. If self-definition as a committed Orthodox
Christian in Russia is correlated to an adherence to the political preferences of the
Patriarchate’s leadership, surely it would show up here, eliminating the alternative
institutional culture explanation. The results of this comparison are as follows:
Table 5. Active Orthodox at secular universities/Orthodox Universities (w/o St.
Filaret) (74 and 287 respondents respectively)

Preference for type of regime

Active Orthodox (secular)

Orthodox Universities

Monarchy

46 %

Democracy

19 %
47 %

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVIII, 2 (May 2008)
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Theocracy

The media should be censored

3%

5%

Dictatorship 9 %

7%

Other

6%

11 %

Don’t know 8 %

16 %

No answer

1%

Agree

3%
38 %

74 %

Unsure

29 %

15 %

Disagree

31 %

9%

No answer 1 %

2%

The West is a purposeful, active

Agree 49 %

65 %

adversary

Unsure 34 %

25 %

Disagree 16 %

9%

No answer 1 %

1%

Russia should have good relations Agree 51 %
with the US/Europe
Unsure 29 %

19 %
42 %

Disagree 19 %

37 %

No answer 1 %

2%

Globalization is a negative

Agree

23 %

62 %

phenomenon

Unsure 50 %

29 %

Disagree 26 %

7%

No answer 1 %

2%

The state should control all

Agree 83 %

94 %

natural resources

Unsure 8 %

4%

Disagree 8 %

1%

No answer 1 %

1%

The market economy has brought Only good 12 %
Russia
More good 58 %

1%
33 %

More bad 14 %

27 %

Only bad 1 %

1%

Hard to say 15 %

37 %

No answer 0%

1%

Ideally, the state is fully

Agree 54 %

61 %

responsible for citizens’ welfare

Unsure 27 %

27 %

Disagree 19 %

11 %

No answer 0%

1%
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To be Russian is to be Orthodox

Harmful Sects should be banned

Agree fully 26 %

49 %

Agree but not always 47 %

33 %

Disagree 24 %

16 %

Unsure 2 %

1%

No answer 1 %

1%

Agree 81 %

95 %

Unsure 15 %

4%

Disagree 4 %

1%

Orthodoxy should be state religion Agree 50 %

72 %

Unsure 23 %

16%

Disagree 27 %

12 %

No answer 0 %

0%

Strikingly, the students of the “Orthodox universities” turn out to be far more
conservative than their presumable ideological counterparts in the secular institutions
on all counts. Only in one case is the disconnect less than 10 percentage points: 61% of
“Orthodox university” students feel that the state should be responsible for citizen
welfare, as opposed to 54% of “active Orthodox” from the secular universities. On three
other points the “Orthodox university” students are around 15 percentage points more
conservative than their colleagues: The negative role of the West (+16), state control of
natural resources (+12), and the need to ban harmful sects (+14). On four questions the
difference is between 20 and 30 percentage points: The ideal form of government (+27
more monarchists among the “Orthodox university” students), the need to pursue an
anti-American/anti-European foreign policy (+24), on the question of Orthodoxy and
Russianness (fully 23 percentage points more of the “Orthodox university” students feel
this is the case all of the time) and on the issue of Orthodoxy as “state religion” (+22).
In the remaining two categories, the difference reaches nearly 40 percentage points: +39
“Orthodox university” students feel globalization is a negative phenomenon, and +37
believe that the government should introduce censorship into the media. While there
is a 10 percentage point difference between the responses of those believing the market
economy to be unequivocally good, the “Orthodox university” students are 25
percentage points more conservative on this question once the categories “Only good”
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and “More good than harm” are combined. Finally, in general, it appears from the
responses that while 31% of the secular university “active” Orthodox students favor
some form of authoritarian government, that figure reaches 58% among the students of
the “Orthodox universities.”
If I am correct, then, the institutional culture of the “Orthodox universities” is
such that it at least strongly reinforces existing conservative tendencies among actively
Orthodox students, if it does not directly cause them. Otherwise, if adherence to
Orthodoxy were strongly linked by itself to a preference for the political ideology of the
Patriarchate, there would be no appreciable difference between the two categories of
students compared here.
Overall, then, the survey results support the picture in which the Moscow
Patriarchate has a limited influence on the political attitudes among Russia’s population.
While the active Orthodox surveyed here appear to be as a rule more conservative than
their nominally Orthodox (or non-Orthodox) colleagues, the fact that this changes
dramatically depending on the institutions surveyed suggests that the influence of the
Patriarchate even on this population of Russian citizens is much more limited than one
would expect. Ultimately, the majority of the students at the “Orthodox universities”
appear to follow the orientations of the more conservative (if not to say fundamentalist)
faction within the Russian Orthodox Church. However, it is not clear whether this
means very much: While the political subculture here is clearly quite conservative, it is
also distant from the political orientations demonstrated by the Orthodox students at the
lay universities (both active and nominal). Moreover, most of the students of the
“Orthodox universities” are specifically prepared to either enter the priesthood or
pursue teaching careers within Orthodox institutions; their colleagues at the “lay”
universities, on the other hand, are much more likely to go into politics and – as
graduates of Moscow’s elite schools – have an impact on the development of the
political system in the Russian Federation. In the end, it becomes clear that one cannot
speak of a significant direct impact by the Moscow Patriarchate on the political leanings
of the upcoming political elite, even if it does happen to be actively Orthodox.
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